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ABSTRACT 
People are often faced with a self-control dilemma whenever the attainment of a long-
term goal would come at the expense of an alluring temptation.  The goal-conflict model of 
eating (Stroebe, van Koningsbruggen, Papies, & Aarts, 2013) suggests that restrained eaters (i.e., 
chronic dieters) experience self-regulation failure (e.g., overeating, or disinhibition) due to inner 
competing goals of eating enjoyment and weight control.  The current study examined these 
concepts in a sample of people classified as unrestrained eaters (N = 123), allowing for an 
investigation of restricted cognitive focus as a causal mechanism of disinhibited eating.  A 2 
(restraint condition: restriction, intuitive eating) X 2 (temptation manipulation: temptation, no 
temptation) study design was used to manipulate cognitive restraint and temptation, thus 
modeling goal-conflict.  Results of both a pilot study and the laboratory based experiment 
indicated the restraint manipulation was effective, such that those in the restriction condition 
showed greater resistance to eating and reported a greater positive change in desire to cognitively 
manage food intake at the end of the experiment; however, food consumption did not change 
based on temptation or restraint conditions. Though findings did not support predictions that a 
restricted cognitive focus is a causal mechanism of disinhibited eating, it appears restraint does 
operate on a cognitive level and additional work is needed to further examine the effects of time 
and context in the relation between cognitive restraint and eating behaviors.   
  Keywords: dietary restraint, cognition, eating behavior 
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A Manipulation of Cognitive Restriction and Goal-Conflict: Mechanisms Underlying the 
Disinhibition Effect of Eating Behavior 
Imagine yourself staring through the window of a bakery on a frigid winter evening.  The 
snow is falling and you longingly gaze at a counter of freshly baked blueberry muffins, 
imagining the warmth that would fill you with just one bite.  No, you tell yourself.  You don’t 
need to eat one.  You try to turn away but feel a pull – a tantalizing desire - that you can’t seem 
to escape.  Gravitating towards the door, you walk inside the bakery, order a muffin (or two), and 
like a tickle to your foot, fulfill your desire.  You eat. 
  The experience mentioned above is a common one: Temptation is regularly experienced 
in everyday life, whereby people find themselves in the midst of a tug-of-war in which they long 
to give into their desires but also wish to refrain from doing so.  People rarely desire one thing at 
a time and are often faced with a self-control dilemma whenever the attainment of a high-order, 
long term goal would come at the expense of a low-order, yet alluring temptation (e.g., 
Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Pelaez-Fenandez & Extremera, 2011;Veling, Aarts, & Papies, 
2011).  For instance, a dieter’s desire to eat a blueberry muffin clearly contrasts with his desire to 
maintain a low-fat diet.  Thus, the process of resolving inner conflict involves prioritizing the 
goal of upmost importance in the moment (Stroebe, van Koningsbruggen, Papies, & Aarts, 
2013).    
Self-regulation, or the capacity to control one’s inner impulses and interrupt undesired 
behavioral tendencies (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), is viewed as desirable. 
However, self-regulation attempts frequently fail, and individuals aren’t able to engage in 
effortful control in all situations. In the eating domain it has been well established that a broad 
range of related behavioral problems (e.g., dieting, eating restriction) have self-regulation failure 
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as a common core (Stroebe et al., 2013; Pelaez-Fernandez & Extremera, 2011; Johnson, Pratt, & 
Wardle, 2012), though the specific mechanisms contributing to this effect are less clear.   
Restrained Eating 
Literature identifies restrained eaters as a specific group of individuals who appear to be 
at-risk for failure in self-control (Stroebe et al., 2013; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Hofmann, 
Adriaanse, Vohs & Baumeister, 2013).  Believed to be chronic dieters or weight suppressors, 
restrained eaters are assumed to cognitively manage their food intake for the purpose of weight 
loss or weight control (Herman & Polivy, 1980; Burger & Stice, 2011).  Unlike unrestrained 
eaters who allow internal hunger cues regulate their food intake, restrained eaters adhere to self-
set dieting rules and are characterized by restriction in their eating habits (Herman & Mack, 
1975) yet ironically exhibit disinhibited  eating behavior in certain situations (Coelho, Jansen, 
Roefs, & Nederkoorn, 2009) . 
 Overwhelmingly, evidence suggests that disinhibition is context-dependent (Blechert, 
Feige, Hajcak, & Tushcen-Caffier, 2010; Patel & Schlundt, 2001), such that restrained eaters are 
at risk for eliminating their chronic restraints in situations where they are in the presence of (or 
come into contact with) external cues (e.g., Herman & Polivy, 1980, 1984).  Research 
investigating restrained eating often uses in-vivo food priming techniques (e.g., Stroebe, 2008; 
Papies & Hamstra, 2010; Rotenberg & Flood, 2000; Yum Sin & Vartanian, 2012; Polivy, 
Heatherton, & Herman, 1988), whereby participants consume a small amount of food (i.e., 
preload; often a calorically dense or palatable food) and are given access to ad-libitum food 
during a taste test.  For restrained eaters, the food preload disinhibits participant’s restriction, 
which results in increased food intake; however, for unrestrained eaters, the opposite pattern is 
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shown and less food is consumed following a preload (Stroebe, 2008; Urbszat, Herman, & 
Polivy, 2002; Herman & Mack, 1975). 
 Beyond effects of preload on eating behavior, cues themselves may be salient enough to 
induce disinhibition among restrained eaters.  Research suggests that eating regulation can easily 
be disturbed by external food cues, which strongly influence appetite by way of increased 
craving and urges in restrained eaters (Green, Rogers, & Elliman, 2000).  Studies show that 
restrained eaters display higher levels of salivation to the presence of palatable food (Brunstorm, 
Yates, & Witcomb, 2004) and to the smell of food (LeGoff & Spigelman, 1987),  experience 
stronger urges to eat the cued food than unrestrained eaters (Fedoroff, Polivy, & Herman, 1997, 
2003; Harvey, Kemps, & Tiggemann, 2005), and are more likely to show disinhibition when 
exposed to such food cues (Collins, 1978; Harvey et al., 2005; Fedoroff et al., 1997; Jansen & 
van den Hout, 1991).  Such evidence suggests that appealing food cues have a strong impact on 
the eating behavior of restrained, compared to unrestrained, individuals.   
The Goal-Conflict Model of Eating Behavior 
As mentioned above, literature identifies the self-control dilemma (i.e., inner conflict 
between competing weight control vs. eating enjoyment goals when in temptation scenarios) as a 
key mechanism underlying self-regulation failure for individuals with high levels of eating 
restraint (Pelaez-Fernandez & Extremera, 2011).  This mechanism provides important 
information regarding the disinhibition effect; however, the process by which the self-control 
dilemma arises and which goal will be acted on are less understood.  
Recently, Stroebe and colleagues (2013) directly applied the self-control dilemma to 
eating domain.  Their goal-conflict model of eating posits that the eating behavior of those trying 
to restrict or control food intake is determined by two conflicting goals: the goal of eating 
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enjoyment and the goal of weight control.  The model explains that for some restrained eaters, 
behavioral restriction (e.g., low calorie consumption) is possible, whereby repeated successes in 
self-control increases the accessibility of the weight control goal and the likelihood that it will be 
pursued in temptation scenarios.   For most restrained eaters, however, exposure to palatable 
food often increases the accessibility of the eating enjoyment goal (e.g., Papies et al., 2007), 
which results in an inhibition of the weight control goal (e.g., Stroebe et al., 2008).    
Group or cognitive process? 
Extant research overwhelmingly investigates restrained eating through the lens of 
restrained eaters as a group (Herman & Polivy, 1980; Fedoroff et al., 1997, 2003; Green et al., 
1994). However, there are two ways in which construing restrained eating as a trait taxonomy 
might be incorrect.  First, given that restrained eaters are defined by a cutpoint (i.e., Revised 
Restraint Scale scores > 16 for females, > 12 for males), potentially valuable information about 
restraint as a dimensional characteristic is lost.  While taxa differ from normality in kind, 
dimensions differ in degree.  Considering restraint to be a grouping assumes it to be a discrete 
entity with absolute boundaries dividing it from non-restraint, thus implying individuals either 
possess restraint-like tendencies or they do not.  Given evidence suggesting that restrained eating 
is often a precursor to disordered eating and even full eating disordered diagnoses (Heatherton & 
Polivy, 1992; Johnson, Pratt, & Wardle, 2012), it makes sense to consider it to be located on a 
spectrum, varying in degree of severity at the individual level. 
Second, while it’s possible restrained eating reflects a general, stylistic approach to 
eating; it may also be that restrained eating reflects momentary cognitive processing, which 
warrants future testing. Research on cognitive theories of eating pathology suggests that 
individuals with eating disorders have highly elaborate cognitive structures (i.e., schemas) that 
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focus on food, weight and shape information (Bemis-Vitousck & Hollon, 1990; Williamson, 
1996). Overuse of these schemas can lead to information processing errors (e.g., selective 
memory and/or attention for schema-related cues) which may contribute to maladaptive 
behaviors, such as food preoccupation or overeating (Green et al., 2000).  
Similar to individuals with clinical levels of eating pathology, high levels of dietary 
restraint have been associated with impairments in cognitive processing efficiency (Higgs, 2007; 
Green, Rogers, Elliman, & Gatenby, 1994; Mann & Ward, 2004).  For example, restrained eaters 
exhibit poorer proof-reading performance in the presence of a food distractor (Herman, Polivy, 
Pliner, Threlkeld, & Munic, 1978), slower simple reaction times, poorer vigilance performance, 
and worse immediate recall than unrestrained eaters in the presence of food (Green et al., 1994), 
and slower reaction times on tasks completed while thinking about a favorite food (Fedoroff et 
al., 1997; Harvey et al., 2005).  
Taken together, research indicates restrained individuals experience cognitive processing 
deficits when in the face of temptation (e.g., exposure to palatable food cues); however, it 
remains a question if these deficits are due to stylistic differences of restrained eaters, considered 
either as a trait group or varying on a dimension based on degree of restraint, or if cognitive 
restraint is actually a causal mechanism.  The goal-conflict phenomenon was derived from 
research examining the disinhibition effect in restrained eaters.  In other words, this theory is 
rooted in individuals who are grouped together based on an arbitrary cutoff score that suggests 
their eating behaviors reflect dietary restriction.  To have goals, thoughts must first drive their 
existence, as goals are defined as cognitive representations of desirable outcomes (Aarts & 
Elliot, 2012).  Does goal-conflict exist solely in this group of people, or could it be that restraint 
based thoughts produce goal-conflict, which leads to self-control failure? 
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 To begin addressing the above question, we must begin to understand the underlying 
cognitive mechanisms that may contribute to the observed difficulties in self-regulation among 
individuals high in eating restraint.  As such, I will next review models of ego depletion, craving 
and hot/cold processing as possible elements that may contribute to disinhibition associated with 
restraint. 
Ego Depletion 
The theory of ego depletion states that all acts of self-control draw on a common limited 
resource that is akin to energy or strength, such that exerting self-control is followed by a period 
of diminished capacity to exert subsequent self-control (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). For 
example, studies show that restrained eaters consume more food during instances in which they 
are mentally tired, such as when assigned to do a cognitively demanding task prior to a taste test 
(Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski, 2007; Ward & Mann, 2000) or are instructed to suppress 
emotional expression (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000, Study 3).  This lesser ability to exert self-
control might be attributed to cognitive load, or the total amount of mental effort being used in 
the working memory, whereby continuous exertion of mental effort leads to greater mental 
fatigue (i.e., depletion) and problems with subsequent self-control. If restrained eating reflects 
thought-based mechanisms like it is assumed to, it may be that cognitive processing impairments 
in temptation situations result from specific restraint-based thoughts that are prompted from 
exposure to food-cues, rather than from general mental fatigue.  This model of ego depletion 
would support a goal-conflict model whereby conflicting mental goals contribute to subsequent 
disinhibition. 
In contrast, the process model of ego depletion (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012) holds that 
initial exertions of self-control influence motivation and attention, such that that exerting self-
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control at one time point causes temporary shifts in both motivation (e.g., toward hedonic 
pleasure)and attention (e.g., toward reward, away from restraint) that undermine later instances 
of self-control.  Thus, following depletion, individuals who cognitively restrict their food intake 
may find it increasingly difficult to control eating behavior when exposed to palatable food cues 
due to intrusive thoughts about eating enjoyment, which impairs their abilities to focus on eating 
control (Stroebe et al., 2013).  As such, the process model of ego depletion would posit that goal-
conflict, an effortful and taxing experience, would cause attention and motivation to shift 
towards the hedonic pleasure goal and away from the weight control goal, therefore contributing 
to later lapses in self-control (i.e., disinhibition).  
Craving Mechanisms 
 An array of research suggests that the mere exposure to the smell or sight of palatable 
food triggers increased urges in individuals attempting to restrict their food intake (e.g., Fedoroff 
et al., 1997, 2003; Rogers & Hill, 1989).  Literature identifies multiple theories of craving (see 
Drummond, 2001 for a review), with models illuminating how urges might predict the effect of 
craving in response to cues (i.e., cue-induced craving) on behavior.  Though most models are 
situated in the realm of addictive behaviors, the cognitive processing model (Tiffany, 1990; 
Tiffany & Conklin, 2000) is relevant in examining the thought processes which occur in 
temptation scenarios.  Originally developed to understand the process of craving in addicts, the 
cognitive processing model purports that long time users develop habitual and automatic 
processing for drug cues, which negates the necessity of craving to elicit behavior.  In other 
words, cues (e.g., a commercial showcasing beer) may lead to target acquisition (e.g. retrieving a 
beer from the refrigerator) regardless of whether the individual is consciously craving or not. 
Conscious craving, then, is the result of non-automatic (i.e., effortful) processing when 
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accessibility is blocked due to external factors (e.g. the liquor store is closed and an alcoholic 
can’t buy beer) or because of internal factors, like a desire to quit.  This cognitive processing 
status of addicts has been made analogous to restrained eating (Overduin & Jansen, 1996), 
whereby individuals under conditions of restraint (e.g., internal weight control goals) should 
experience craving in the face of temptation (i.e., when experiencing goal-conflict), which would 
contribute to the disinhibition effect. 
Additionally, the Elaborated Intrusion Theory of Desire (Kavnaugh, Andrade, & May, 
2005) distinguishes between basic, associative processes from higher level elaborative processes.  
Specifically, automatic processes associated with desire lead to spontaneous thoughts (i.e., 
intrusions) and an elaborative cycle is born, which encompasses the cognitive processes involved 
in retrieving information from memory and using that information to construct life-like images 
of the desired target.  In this model, cognitive elaboration contains strong, affective links and 
increases the immediate likelihood of fulfilling one’s desire.  Thus, it may be that individuals 
high in eating restraint have strong, affective links to memories or thoughts of food, which 
strengthen the experience of temptation.  The Elaborated Intrusion Theory would suggest that 
people experience intrusive, life-like images of temptation during moments of goal-conflict, 
which increase craving and contribute to subsequent disinhibition. Though researchers have 
studied desire in restrained and unrestrained eaters (Polivy, Coleman, & Herman, 2005; Fedoroff 
et al., 2003; Svaldi, Tuschen-Caffier, Lackner, Zimmermann, & Naumann, 2012), the theoretical 
restraint-based thoughts that may occur during temptation scenarios have yet to be fully 
explored.   
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Hot/Cool Cognitive/Affective Processing 
 Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) proposed a 2-system framework, the Hot/Cool-System, for 
better understanding the cognitive processes that enable – and undermine – self-control.  The hot 
emotional system is specialized for quick emotional processing (i.e., the “go” system), and the 
cool cognitive system is specialized for complex spatiotemporal and episodic representation and 
thought (i.e., the “know” system).  When these two systems interact, issues often arise with self-
regulation and goal-oriented behavior (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).  Because affect and cognition 
are controlled by two separate systems, individuals may act on emotions in certain situations if 
their emotions precede their knowledge due to the faster speed of the hot- compared to the cool-
system response,.  For those with eating restriction goals, then, situational aspects (i.e., food 
cues) are triggered, which may activate the “hot,” emotional system, therefore overriding the 
long-term/weight-maintenance goal (i.e., the “cool” system) and causing them to act on emotion 
to fulfill the current desire.  Thus, the Hot/Cool-system suggests the activation of the “hot” 
system is more likely to produce behavior, which highlights the importance of emotion in the 
experience of desire.   
General Self-Control 
 While understanding the cognitive processes that undermine self-control is of 
fundamental importance, it is necessary to briefly review a basic model of self-control that most 
directly applies to goal-conflict.  At the core of this model is motivation, otherwise known as a 
mechanism directing behavior toward obtaining satisfaction (Hofmann, Baumeister, Forster, & 
Vohs, 2012).  Hofmann and colleagues’ (2012) four-step model of motivated behavior integrates 
the components of desire, conflict, resistance (use of self-control), and enactment, such that 
desires vary in their potential to motivate behavior, and sometimes conflict with the person’s 
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values and goals.  Such conflict, according to this framework, is an important triggering 
mechanism for a person’s active efforts at resisting desire.  Using self-control, then, involves the 
effortful prevention of enacting the desire and depends on the degree of conflict experience.  
Thus, the association between conflict and behavioral enactment is best understood as mediated 
through the recruitment of self-control (i.e., resistance), such that greater conflict prompts greater 
behavioral resistance, which decreases the likelihood of behavioral enactment.  In other words, 
this model suggests that goal conflict would reduce disinhibition, because it prompts self-control 
and increases behavioral resistance.  
However, there is an important distinction to be made in the conceptualization of 
resistance via the Hofmann and colleagues (2012) model and resistance in the proposed research 
mentioned here.  Behavioral resistance (e.g., refusing a slice of cake), as depicted through 
models of self-control, is qualitatively different than cognitive resistance, or restraint (e.g., 
thinking you shouldn’t eat cake because you need to watch your weight). Specifically, cognitive 
restriction may result in one of two outcomes: the act of behavioral restriction or indulgence in 
temptation.  Thus, behavioral and cognitive restrictions appear to be rather different from one 
another, such that behavioral restriction is one of two byproducts of cognitive restriction.  
When cognitive resistance is experienced consciously in temptation situations, behavioral 
resistance often follows.  However, there are two instances in which behavioral resistance may 
not be acted upon.  First, cognitive restraint may be experienced at the subconscious level, which 
may not be salient enough to produce desired behavior (i.e., resistance).  Second, cognitive 
resistance may be weaker than the impulse to indulge in temptation and therefore not effective in 
altering behavior.  Thus, it’s certainly possible that internal conflict may lead to actively resisting 
a particular temptation; however, it would also make sense that actively trying to cognitively 
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resist palatable food while being surrounded by it should create mental goal-conflict (e.g., 
Hofmann et al., 2012),  which may contribute to the disinhibition effect.    
Current Study 
Overall, more evidence is needed to fully understand how restraint operates on a 
cognitive level and what effect it has on eating behaviors. If the disinhibition seen in restrained 
eaters is based on cognitive mechanisms, then those mechanisms can likely be modeled and 
manipulated in unrestrained eaters to test the causal effects of a restrained mindset on eating 
behavior.   
The aim of this research was to extend previous findings by studying these concepts in an 
unrestrained sample and to investigate restricted cognitive focus as a causal mechanism of 
disinhibited eating.  An online pilot study was first developed to test the effectiveness of the 
restraint manipulation used in the main laboratory based study.  The pilot study randomly 
assigned participants to restraint condition, and results were used to determine what changes 
needed to be made prior to beginning the laboratory study.  The laboratory based study used a 2 
(restraint condition: restriction, intuitive eating) X 2 (temptation manipulation: temptation, no 
temptation) study design, whereby both cognitive restraint and temptation were manipulated, 
thus modeling goal-conflict. 
The current study tested a series of predictions.   First, I predicted that people guided to 
think in a restricted mindset would exhibit more disinhibition (i.e., greater food consumption) 
after being exposed to food temptations as compared to neutral temptations, whereas people 
guided to think in an unrestrained or intuitive eating mindset would consume equal amounts of 
food following an initial exposure to food and neutral temptations.  Such findings would suggest 
that being exposed to a food-cue while thinking about food in a restrictive way creates goal-
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conflict by activating the “eating enjoyment” goal, thereby resulting in greater food 
consumption. 
Second, I predicted that those guided to think restrictively about food would report lower 
levels of positive and greater levels of negative affect compared to those guided to think 
intuitively about food.  Additionally, I anticipated negative mood would increase and positive 
mood would decrease over time for those guided to think restrictively about food, whereas 
negative mood should remain constant or decrease and positive affect should increase for those 
guided to think intuitively about food.  I predicted positive affect would be higher following 
exposure to food temptation for those guided to think intuitively about food; however, I 
anticipated positive affect would be lower following food temptation exposure for those guided 
to think restrictively about food.  Such predictions would indicate that thinking in a restrictive 
way about food is unpleasant and has a downstream effect on affective states that changes as a 
function of situational factors (e.g., temptation). 
 Third, I predicted that levels of craving and resistance would be higher among those 
guided to think restrictively about food compared to those guided to think intuitively during 
exposure to food temptations; however, after being exposed to neutral objects, I anticipated only 
resistance would be significantly higher for those guided to think restrictively about food 
compared to those guided to think intuitively about food.  Results in support of this prediction 
would suggest that a restricted mindset, in conjunction with exposure to palatable food and 
temptation, would heighten both craving and resistance, providing evidentiary support for the 
goal-conflict model of eating behavior. 
Should predictions not be supported, it may suggest that other common factors among 
restrained eaters, rather than the theoretical cognitive control of food intake and internal goal-
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conflict, are better (yet less known) predictors of overeating behavior that warrant further 
investigation.   
Experiment 1: A Pilot Study 
 Prior to testing the main hypotheses outlined above, I designed a pilot study to test the 
materials used in the restraint manipulation.  The overall aim of the pilot study was to test 
whether a restrained eating manipulation would be effective in shifting individuals’ self-reported 
strategies used to guide their eating behaviors.  Specifically, the overall goal of the pilot study 
was to assess whether reading an article designed to influence thoughts regarding eating 
behaviors would be effective at altering participant’s desires to allow intuitive eating or cognitive 
restraint to guide their eating.   
Method 
Participants  
 Undergraduate psychology subject pool participants (N = 123, 65.9% female) were 
awarded ½ credit to complete a short online study which they believed was designed to examine 
their reactions to research related to achieving a healthy lifestyle.  Because the purpose of this 
initial pilot study was to assess the effectiveness of the restraint manipulation for all people, 
individuals were not screened based on eating history and there were no exclusionary criteria.  
Restrained eating status was assessed on the day of the pilot study to allow a full and 
comprehensive assessment of the manipulation’s effectiveness as a function of restrained eating 
status.  
Measures 
The Revised Restraint Scale (RRS; Polivy, Herman, & Howard, 1988) is a ten-item 
measure of restrained eating behaviors (i.e., altering or limiting eating behavior as a result of 
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image or weight perception).  Ratings are completed on a 5 point Likert-type scale (0 = never to 
4 = always) and are summed to produce a total score ranging from 0 to 40, with higher total 
scores indicating greater restrained eating behavior.  Subjects with scores of 15 or lower were 
considered to be unrestrained eaters (Polivy et al., 1988). The internal consistency of the Revised 
Restraint Scale for the pilot study was α =.76. 
Eating Strategy. Participants completed two separate questionnaires to assess the strategy 
they use to manage their eating behavior.   The first questionnaire was completed prior to the 
manipulation and asked participants to “Please rate the strategy you use to guide your eating 
behavior” on a 9-point Likert-type scale (0 = mentally plan when and how much I should eat to 8 
= let my internal sensations of hunger).  The second questionnaire was completed post-
manipulation and asked participants to “Please rate the strategy you WANT to use to guide your 
eating behavior” in a similar 9-point Likert-type scale.   
State Assessment. Participants reported state levels of craving, positive affect, negative 
affect and resistance (e.g., “RIGHT NOW, how much do you want to resist eating?”) on visual 
analogue scales ranging from 0 (no current craving, not at all positive, not at all negative, no 
desire to resist) to 100 (extreme craving, extremely positive, extremely negative, extreme desire 
to resist).  
Procedure 
Prior to manipulation participants completed an initial eating strategy measure. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to restraint condition (restriction, intuitive eating) in 
which they read a research study indicating that cognitively restricting and controlling their food 
intake (restriction condition), or allowing their internal cues of hunger and fullness (intuitive 
eating condition) was found to be most beneficial in helping people achieve  a healthy lifestyle 
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(See Appendix A).  Following the restraint manipulation, participants completed a quiz to test 
their recollection of article material.  Participants who failed the quiz by answering less than 5 
out of the 6 total questions correctly were redirected to the article and instructed to read it again 
before taking the quiz a second time.  Those who failed the quiz on the second trial completed 
the duration of the study but were excluded from data analysis.  Following the quiz, participants 
were asked to write a short description of “How you can use the ideas presented in the article in 
your life” to foster cognitive elaboration on the material presented and then were asked to rate 
the strategy they want to use to guide their eating behavior.  Finally, participants completed a 
state assessment of positive affect, negative affect, craving, and resistance before completing the 
Revised Restraint Scale to assess restrained eating status.  Participants were then debriefed and 
received credit for their participation. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Content quiz manipulation check 
 I first examined participant’s scores on the Revised Restraint Scale.  Of the 123 
participants who completed the pilot study, 44 had RRS scores of 16 or higher (M = 19.11, SD = 
2.70) and were categorized as restrained eaters.  The average RRS score for unrestrained eaters 
(n = 72) was 9.36 (SD = 3.60).   
I first examined participant’s scores on the content quiz following the restraint 
manipulation.  Of the 123 participants, 12 were excluded from further data analysis because they 
did not read the manipulation carefully enough to achieve a score of 5 or greater.  There were no 
significant differences in excluded participants based on restraint condition.   Both restrained and 
unrestrained eaters were included in subsequent analyses to evaluate the effectiveness of my 
16 
 
manipulation as a function of restrained eating status.  Thus, the remaining participants (n = 109, 
64.2% female, Mage = 20.29, 85.3% white) were included in the following analyses.   
Eating strategy manipulation check 
I performed a 2 (restraint condition: restriction, intuitive eating) X 2 (eating status: 
restrained eater, unrestrained eater) X 2 (time: pre-manipulation, post-manipulation) between-
subjects factorial ANOVA on eating strategy.  There was a significant main effect of time, 
F(1,104)=7.43, p = .008, such that participants decreased their use of intuitive eating to guide 
their eating behaviors from baseline (M = 5.60, SD = 2.34) to post-restraint manipulation (M = 
4.80, SD = 3.11).   This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between time and 
condition, F(1,104) = 129.31, p < .001.  Eating strategy scores changed such that participants in 
the intuitive eating condition increased their intuitive eating from baseline (M = 5.76, SD = 2.42) 
to post-restraint manipulation (M = 7.78, SD = 1.52),F(1,48) = 31.84, p < .001. However, for 
those in the restriction condition, eating strategy scores decreased in intuitive eating (i.e., scores 
increased in restrictive eating) from baseline (M = 5.47, SD = 2.28) to post-restraint manipulation 
(M = 2.22, SD = 1.29), F(1,56) = 116.94, p < .001(See Figure 1).  There was not a significant 
interaction between time and eating status, nor was there a significant 3-way interaction between 
time, condition, and eating status.   This suggests the manipulation was equally effective, 
irrespective of classification as a restrained or unrestrained eater. 
State Assessment  
In terms of state resistance to eating I performed a 2 (restraint condition: restriction, 
intuitive eating) X 2 (eating status: restrained eater, unrestrained eater) between-subjects factorial 
ANOVA on state resistance.  There was a significant main effect of eating status, such that 
restrained eaters (M = 51.34, SD = 38.12) reported greater state-level resistance toward eating 
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than unrestrained eaters (M = 31.92, SD = 33.33), F(1,101) = 8.69, p = .004.  There was also a 
significant main effect of condition, such that those in the restriction condition (M = 48.02, SD = 
36.24) reported greater resistance than those in the intuitive eating condition (M = 29.40, SD = 
34.20), F(1,101) = 5.08, p = .03.  There was a marginally significant interaction between eating 
status and condition F(3,101) = 3.19, p = .08 (See Figure 2).  Follow-ups revealed that 
unrestrained eaters, as expected, in the restriction condition reported a greater desire to resist 
eating (M = 44.82, SD = 34.34) than unrestrained eaters in the intuitive eating condition (M = 
17.30, SD = 25.60), t(62) = 3.60, p = .001.  However, restrained eaters showed little differences 
in resistance to eating between the restriction (M = 52.74, SD = 39.17) and intuitive eating (M = 
49.56, SD = 37.78) conditions, t(39) = .26, p = .79.   There were no significant main effects or 
interactions when examining positive affect, negative affect, or craving. 
Discussion 
Taken together, results indicate the manipulation was effective.  Regardless of restrained 
eating status, participants in the restriction condition reported a greater desire to cognitively 
manage and control their food intake at the end of the study compared to those in the intuitive 
eating condition, despite that there were no differences prior to the manipulation. Additionally, 
positive affect, negative affect, and craving were not affected based on the manipulation, as 
evidenced by no significant main effects or interactions between study variables on these 
outcomes.  This suggests the research articles designed to induce a restrictive mindset toward 
eating were powerful enough to do so.  This was apparent across multiple measures of resistance 
(i.e., self-reported eating strategy, state-level eating resistance), and changes in eating strategy 
occurred without similar changes in other important state-level variables that may influence self-
reported restriction (e.g., craving, positive affect, negative affect).  Thus, the changes in eating 
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strategy and resistance outcomes appear due to the manipulation and not due to alternative 
mechanisms. 
The goal of the current study was to model and manipulate a restricted cognitive focus 
toward eating.  While there were no main effects of restrained eater status on desire to use 
intuitive eating or cognitive restraint to guide eating behavior following the restraint 
manipulation, results do suggest restrained eaters may be influenced by the manipulation 
differently than unrestrained eaters.  Specifically, restrained eaters reported greater end of the 
study state-level resistance toward eating than unrestrained eaters (irrespective of restraint 
condition), which suggests they may be more likely to change their strategy to guide their eating 
behavior as a function of their restrained eating history and not solely based on the study 
manipulation.  This is problematic, given the overall aim of this research is to model and 
manipulate a restrictive approach toward eating.  Additionally, in the intuitive eating condition, 
restrained eaters reported a greater desire to resist eating than unrestrained eaters, which suggests 
they may be unwilling and/or unable to think in a different way about eating.   Thus, these results 
suggest that restrained eaters should not be included in the laboratory based study, and recruiting 
individuals who did not have a baseline predisposition to restrict food intake and control their 
eating behavior was therefore of utmost importance.  
Experiment 2: A Laboratory-Based Manipulation of Goal-Conflict 
Method 
Participants  
A total of 1,312 psychology subject pool participants completed a set of pre-screening 
questions to determine their eligibility.  Participants completed the Revised Restraint Scale 
(RRS) to assess their eating status and were categorized as unrestrained eaters with scores of 15 
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or below.  As a goal of this study was to investigate the study hypotheses in a healthy sample to 
focus exclusively on the impact of cognitive restraint in individuals without clinically significant 
psychopathology that might impact the study results, pre-screening questions also inquired about 
common mental health problems.  Individuals with a self-reported current or former eating 
diagnosis (a response of ‘yes” to the question “Have you ever been diagnosed with an eating 
disorder?”) were not eligible to participate.  In addition, participants were also excluded if they 
reported current milk, dairy, nut, or gluten allergies, as the study involved interacting with and 
consuming different foods.  Of the 1,312 participants screened, 988 were eligible to participate.  
An overall sample of 158 participants (Mage =19.47, 62% female, 74.2% white) completed the 
laboratory based study. 
Measures 
The Revised Restraint Scale (RRS; Polivy, Herman, & Howard, 1988) was administered 
on the prescreening questionnaire and showed an internal consistency for the total restraint score 
of  α = .75.  Participants with scores of 15 or less were classified as unrestrained eaters and were 
invited to complete the laboratory based study.  The RRS was again administered during the 
laboratory session to verify restraint status.  
The Brief Self-Control Scale (BSCS; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004) measures 
dispositional self-regulatory behaviors using 13 items rated on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 
(Not at all like me) to 5 (Very much like me).  Example items are “People would say that I have 
iron self-discipline” and “I often act without thinking through all the alternatives.” The BSCS 
has been shown to positively correlate with binge eating behaviors (r = .35) (Tangney et al., 
2004) and demonstrated adequate internal consistency in the current study (α = .81) 
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 The Evaluative Space Grid (ESG; Larsen, Norris, McGraw, Hawkley, & Cacioppo, 2009) 
was used to assess mixed positive and negative affect.  The measure is displayed graphically in a 
9 X 9 matrix, with current level of positivity (0 to 8) on the X-axis and current level of negativity 
(0 to 8) on the Y-axis (See Appendix A).  The ESG thus provides a measure of positivity (0 to 8) 
and negativity (0 to 8) and a combined mixed affect score can therefore be calculated. Because 
single item ratings are made over time, psychometric properties (e.g., alpha) are not calculable, 
though the measure has been used in several other studies (Larsen & McGraw, 2011; Veilleux, 
Conrad, & Kassel, 2013; Wardle & de Wit, 2012).  The ESG was administered at 4 time points: 
baseline, post-restraint manipulation, post-temptation manipulation, and post taste-test. 
 The Goal-Conflict Grid was used to assess mixed craving and resistance (i.e., goal-
conflict).  I amended the ESG (Larsen et al., 2009) to create this measure, which is also 
displayed graphically in a 9 X 9 matrix, with current level of resistance (0 to 8) on the X-axis and 
current level of craving (0 to 8) on the Y-axis.  Similar to the ESG, the Goal-Conflict Grid 
provides a measure of craving (0 to 8) and resistance (0 to 8) and a combined goal-conflict score 
can therefore be calculated.  The Goal-Conflict Grid was also administered at 4 time points with 
the ESG: baseline, post-restraint manipulation, post-temptation manipulation, and post taste-test 
State Food Measures. Participants’ state-level craving, resistance, hunger, and satiety 
were assessed with one item questions: “How much are you craving food right now?”;“How 
much do you want to refrain from eating right now?”; “How hungry are you right now?”; and 
“Rate your current level of satiety.”  Participants responded on a 10-point Likert-type scale, with 
higher scores indicating greater craving, desires to resist eating, hunger, and satiety.  These items 
were integrated into the food task rating sheets. 
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Eating Strategy. Participants completed two separate questionnaires to assess the strategy 
they use to manage their eating behavior.   The first questionnaire was completed prior to the 
restraint manipulation and asked participants to “Please rate the strategy you use to guide your 
eating behavior” on a 9-point Likert-type scale (0 = mentally plan when and how much I should 
eat to 8 = let my internal sensations of hunger determine when and how much I should eat).  The 
second questionnaire was completed post-restraint manipulation and asked participants to 
“Please rate the strategy you WANT to use to guide your eating behavior” on a similar 9-point 
Likert-type scale.   
Procedure 
Eligible participants were invited to sign up for a 90-minute laboratory session.  
Participants were instructed not to eat for 2 hours prior to their appointment to control for 
hunger, following previous research that uses similar methodology (e.g., Fedoroff et al., 1997; 
2003; Ferriday & Brunstrom, 2008; Kroese, Evers, & De Ridder, 2009).  Participants arrived to 
the laboratory, completed informed consent, and then completed a short food-rating task in 
which they consumed 3 Triscuit crackers during a 5 minute period to control for baseline hunger.  
Following the initial taste-rating, participants were asked to complete the Evaluative Space Grid 
questionnaire (ESG; Larsen et al., 2009) and adapted Goal-Conflict Grid at the baseline time 
point to assess positive and negative affect, and craving and resistance, along with two additional 
items asking about current levels of hunger and satiety (refer to Table 1 for study timeline).    
After completing these items, participants were randomized to one of two conditions 
designed to manipulate cognitive restraint.  Individuals in the restriction condition were seated in 
a “diet salient” room (e.g., scale on the floor, dieting books and food magazines in sight) and 
read an experimentally designed article they believed was pulled from an online blog that 
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included personal testaments indicating the best way to achieve a healthy lifestyle was by 
cognitively restricting food intake.  Individuals in the intuitive eating condition were seated in a 
room with intuitive eating materials (e.g., Intuitive Eating book, gardening magazines) and no 
scale in sight, with the article suggesting that attending to physiological hunger signals was most 
beneficial for healthy living.  Previous research (Mann & Ward, 2004) used a similar room setup 
to test the attentional myopia model of behavioral control in a study of food consumption by 
chronic dieters and found that using a “diet salient” room was effective in priming dieting 
behavior among participants. Thus, this room set-up was used to strengthen the restriction 
manipulation beyond merely telling participants what to think.  
 Following manipulation to condition, participants again completed the ESG(Larsen et 
al., 2009) and amended Goal-Conflict Grid at the post-restraint manipulation time point before 
they were exposed to one of two cue types (non-food or food related) as a temptation 
manipulation. The experiment was presented as an investigation of sensory perception and taste 
ratings of everyday objects.  Those receiving non-food cues were seated at a table with three 
different elementary school supplies (e.g., paper clips, erasers, tape).  Participants were asked to 
write about a neutral perceptual experience for 7 minutes (i.e., what they might see, hear, or 
smell if they were to go back to visit their elementary school building) and rated the school 
supplies based on their perceptual qualities (i.e., the look and feel of the items).  Participants 
receiving food-cues were exposed to three different palatable (Skittles, Oreo cookies, peanuts), 
which were presented in small dishes, and were instructed to  spend 7 minutes writing their 
thoughts about these foods and rating their perceptual qualities (i.e., the look and smell of the 
foods) but not consuming them.  Two additional items assessing current level of craving and 
resistance for each food were embedded in the perceptual rating form. 
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Following manipulation to temptation condition participants again completed the ESG 
(Larsen et al., 2009) and amended Goal-Conflict Grid at the post-temptation manipulation time 
point.  After completing these questionnaires, the experimenter brought in a tray of food and 
informed participants they would be completing a taste perception task.  Participants were 
instructed to try each of the foods and rate them on their perceptual qualities (e.g., the look and 
smell of the foods) and taste quality (e.g. “How much did you like the taste of this food?”), as 
well as rate their current levels of craving and resistance to each food.  Participants were given 
10 minutes to complete their ratings and were invited to help themselves to as much food as they 
liked to help them make their ratings.  Participants were presented with large bowls of snack 
foods with food items varying on two factors: Taste (sweet or salty) and Fat Level (low or high).  
The four items rated were plain M&M chocolate candies (sweet, high fat), honey-flavored Teddy 
Grahams (sweet, low fat), plain potato chips (salty, high fat), and pretzels (salty, low fat).  These 
items were chosen following Habhab and colleagues (2009) who standardized these four items to 
ensure they had similar crunchy, non-moist textures. Participants were given 200 calories worth 
of each food to standardize food administration.  Each food was weighed after the taste task to 
measure the total amount of food consumed.  Participants again completed the ESG (Larsen et 
al., 2009) and Goal-Conflict Grid at the post-taste test time point, with two additional items 
assessing current hunger and satiety.  Participants finally completed a set of individual difference 
measures, including measures of eating (e.g. Revised Restraint Scale), and trait self-control 
(BSCS), before being debriefed and awarded credit (See Table 1 for study timeline). 
Analytic Strategy 
 Prior to the primary data analyses, preliminary analyses were conducted to investigate 
changes in restrained eating scores (RRS) between the pre-screener and laboratory based study to 
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identify participants who no longer met inclusionary criteria (i.e., only participants with RRS 
scores of 15 or below were included).  To ensure participants had paid adequate attention to the 
manipulation used in the current study, the content quiz was analyzed and frequencies of the total 
scores by condition were investigated to identify participants to be excluded.  As greater 
resistance in the restriction condition compared to the intuitive eating condition was expected, in 
addition to greater craving in the temptation condition compared to the no temptation condition, 
2 (restraint condition: restriction, intuitive eating) X 2 (temptation condition: temptation, no 
temptation) between subjects factorial ANOVAS were conducted and the interactive effects of 
restraint and temptation conditions on craving and resistance were analyzed as manipulation 
checks (i.e., craving was expected to be higher in the temptation compared to no temptation 
condition; resistance was expected to be higher in the restraint compared to intuitive eating 
condition).   
Major hypotheses were investigated using 2 (restraint condition: restriction, intuitive 
eating) X 2 (temptation condition: temptation, no temptation) ANOVAs on overall food 
consumption, each food independently, as well as combinations of high fat and low fat foods, 
and sweet and salty foods.  To analyze changes in affect and craving and resistance throughout 
the study, 4 (time: baseline, post-restraint manipulation, post-temptation manipulation, post taste-
test) X 2 (restraint condition: restriction, intuitive eating) X 2 (temptation condition: temptation, 
no temptation) mixed models were conducted on positive affect, negative affect, craving, and 
resistance.  
Additionally, craving and resistance scores to the food presented in the taste-test were 
calculated by averaging responses to each food type.  Two 2 (restraint condition: restriction, 
intuitive eating) X 2 (temptation condition: temptation, no temptation) between subjects factorial 
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ANOVAs were conducted on self-reported resistance and craving.  Finally, goal- scores were 
calculated post-temptation task and post-taste test to assess whether the restraint manipulation, in 
conjunction with being exposed to palatable food cues and tasting different foods, created goal-
conflict.  Following previous work (Shimmack, 2001), I used the MIN statistic to conservatively 
quantify the intensity of mixed feelings of craving and resistance.  For ratings of craving and 
resistance, MIN assumes the value of the lower rating at which both factors are elevated.  For 
example, if a participant reports feeling neither craving nor resistance, the MIN would indicate 
that the participant does not feel mixed feelings of craving and resistance and would therefore 
receive a value of 0.  Even when a participant reports feeling extreme craving without resistance, 
MIN would indicate that this individual does not feel mixed feelings, as MIN assumes the value 
of the lower rating at which both factors are elevated.  If a participant reports feeling craving at a 
6-level of intensity and resistance at a 2-level of intensity, the MIN score would therefore be 2, 
which is the highest level at which both craving and resistance are elevated.   
A hierarchical linear regression was computed to assess the causality of a restricted 
mindset on goal-conflict post-temptation manipulation and post-taste test.  Regression analyses 
were not performed at baseline or post-restraint manipulation, as theory indicates that goal-
conflict should not manifest without a situation (e.g., temptation) that contrasts with eating 
restriction. 
Results 
Differences in Revised Restraint Scale Scores 
The intent of the current study was to obtain a clean sample of unrestrained eaters; thus, 
participants were recruited based on restrained eating status from the pre-screener and RRS 
scores were verified at the lab session to confirm eligibility.  Revised Restraint Scale (RRS) 
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scores were missing from 3 of the 158 participants on the day of the study, resulting in the 
exclusion of those participants.   A paired samples t-test on RRS scores at both time points 
revealed the difference in pre-screener and laboratory based restraint scores was statistically 
significant, t(154)=-3.40, p < .01.  Specifically, restrained eating scores were higher (M = 11.17, 
SD = 4.30) the day of the lab study compared to the day of the pre-screener (M = 9.97, SD = 
3.63). The day of the study, 27 participants identified as restrained eaters (scores greater than 15; 
Mage = 19.47 (SD = 1.87), 60.9% female, 72.7% White), and 128 identified as unrestrained eaters 
(Mage = 19.44 (SD = 1.70), 74.1% female, 81.5% White). Chi-square analyses revealed no 
significant differences in demographics across restrained and unrestrained eaters. The only 
significant difference among these groups was on the average restraint score at the lab session. 
The average RRS score for people classified as unrestrained eaters was 9.79 (SD = 3.27), 
whereas the average restraint score for people classified as restrained eaters was 17.70 (SD = 
1.92).  To assess whether there were differences in the proportion of restrained and unrestrained 
eaters based on restraint condition, a chi-square test of independence was performed to examine 
the relation between restrained eating status and restraint condition.  The relation between these 
variables was not significant, χ2 (2, N = 155) = 2.05, p = .15.  Because this study sought to 
manipulate a restricted mindset in people classified as unrestrained eaters, all 27 of restrained 
eating participants were excluded from analyses, leaving a sample of 123 clean unrestrained 
eaters. 
The final sample of participants was thus a total of n = 123, with 61 in the Intuitive 
Eating condition (temptation condition n = 31; no temptation n = 30) and 62 in the Restriction 
condition (temptation condition n = 32; no temptation n = 30).  There were no significant 
differences in restrained eating scores based on temptation (temptation: M = 9.65, SD = 3.31; no 
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temptation: M = 10.03, SD = 3.24) or restraint (restriction: M = 9.58, SD = 3.38; intuitive eating: 
M = 10.10, SD = 3.16) conditions.  Similarly, there were no significant differences on any of the 
demographic variables based on restraint or temptation conditions (See Table 2).  
Manipulation Checks  
Content quiz manipulation check 
Of the people who completed the study, 25 people had scores of 4 or lower on the quiz 
assessing understanding and mastery of material presented on the article read in the restraint 
manipulation and were instructed to re-read the article before completing the quiz again.  Of the 
25 participants, 16 were in the restriction and 9 were in the intuitive eating condition.  A chi-
square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between people who failed 
the manipulation check quiz and restraint condition, and the relationship between these variables 
was not significant, χ2 (2, N = 158) = 1.69, p = .37, suggesting  that quiz failure did not occur due 
to significant differences in level of quiz difficulty across restraint conditions. Five participants 
(4 in the restriction condition, 1 in the intuitive eating condition) failed the quiz upon completing 
it the second time and were therefore excluded from analyses. 
Eating strategy manipulation check 
Analyses were conducted on the change in participant’s self-reported strategy used to 
guide their eating behaviors to assess whether changes occurred as a function of manipulation to 
restraint condition.  A 2 (time: baseline, post-taste test) X 2 (restraint condition: restriction, 
intuitive eating) X 2 (temptation condition: temptation, no temptation mixed model ANOVA was 
conducted on self-reported eating strategy (i.e., “Please rate the strategy you use to guide your 
eating behavior, with higher scores reflecting greater intuitive eating and lower scores reflecting 
greater cognitive control over eating behaviors”) at baseline and post restraint manipulation.  
There was a main effect of time, F(1,119) = 9.92, p = .002, such that participants reported a 
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decrease in use of intuitive eating to guide their eating behaviors (M = 6.79, SD = 2.17) from 
baseline to post-restraint manipulation (M = 6.10, SD = 2.94). This main effect was qualified by 
a significant interaction between time and restraint condition, F(1,119) = 92.68, p < .001. Eating 
strategy scores changed such that participants in the intuitive eating condition increased in 
intuitive eating from baseline to post-restraint manipulation, F(1,59) = 21.00, p < .001. However, 
for those in the restriction condition, eating strategy scores decreased in intuitive eating (i.e., 
scores increased in restrictive eating) from baseline to post-restraint manipulation, F(1,60) = 
81.43, p < .001 (See Figure 3). This result is notable, as it suggests the manipulation appeared to 
shift eating strategy goals for both the restriction and intuitive eating condition, as intended, in 
the directions anticipated.  That is, there was an increase in desire to allow hunger to guide eating 
for people in the intuitive eating condition and a decrease in desire to allow hunger to guide 
eating behavior in favor of cognitively controlling food intake for those in the restriction 
condition. 
Temptation manipulation check 
Participants were asked to rate their desire to approach and avoid each object during the 
temptation task.  Each participant rated 3 objects (e.g., food vs. school supplies, non-food), and I 
calculated average desire and average resistance scores across the 3 objects for each person. A 2 
(restraint condition: restriction, intuitive eating) X 2 (temptation condition: temptation, no 
temptation) between subjects factorial ANOVA was conducted on average desires for the items 
rated during the temptation task.  There was a significant main effect of temptation condition on 
average desires, F(1,118) = 4.14, p = .04.  Those in the temptation condition (M = 5.55, SD = 
2.00) reported greater desires for the items than those in the no temptation condition (M = 4.70, 
SD = 2.30).  There were no significant main effects of restraint condition or interactions between 
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restraint and temptation conditions on average desires for the items.  There was a marginally 
significant main effect of temptation condition on average desire to resist the rated items, 
F(1,118) = 3.80, p = .05.  Those in the temptation condition (M = 3.92, SD = 2.31) reported a 
greater desire to resist the food items than those asked to rate school supplies (M = 3.07, SD = 
2.47).  There was no main effect of restraint condition on desire to resist or interaction between 
restraint and temptation conditions on desire to resist. This result is notable because it suggests 
that the temptation condition influenced desire and resistance goals, as intended, such that both 
desire and resistance goals were greater compared to the group which did not encounter 
temptation.  
Average desire and resistance scores were created across the four foods participants rated 
(Teddy Grahams, pretzels, potato chips, M&M’s) and a 2 (restraint condition: restriction, 
intuitive eating) X 2 (temptation condition: temptation, no temptation) between subjects factorial 
ANOVA was conducted on average desire and resistance scores to the food items during the 
taste task.  There was a significant main effect of restraint condition on desires to resist the food, 
such that those in the restriction condition (M = 4.14, SD = 1.92) reported higher resistance than 
those in the intuitive eating condition (M = 3.32, SD = 1.86), F(1,118) = 5.65, p = .02.  This 
result is worthy of notice, as it suggests the restraint manipulation influenced food resistance 
during the taste test as intended.  No main effects of restraint or temptation condition or 
interaction between both conditions were significant for average desire scores.  
 Hunger and satisfaction manipulation check 
 A 2 (time: baseline, post-taste test) X 2 (restraint condition: restriction, intuitive eating) X 
2 (temptation manipulation: temptation, no temptation) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on 
hunger and satisfaction scores.  There was a main effect of time, such that hunger scores were 
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greater at the beginning of the study (M = 5.40, SD = 2.38) compared to post taste-test at the end 
(M = 4.15, SD = 2.06), F(1,117) = 36.57, p < .001.  Similarly, there was a main effect of time on 
satisfaction scores, F(1,115) = 29.05, p < .001.  Satisfaction scores increased from baseline  (M = 
5.22, SD = 2.27) to post taste-test (M = 6.44, SD = 2.09).   There were no significant interactions 
between time and restraint or time and temptation conditions, nor were there significant 3-way 
interactions between time, restraint condition, and temptation condition on either hunger or 
satisfaction outcomes.  
Central Analyses on Main Outcome Variables 
Food consumption 
Several 2 (restraint condition: restriction, intuitive eating) X 2 (temptation condition: 
temptation, no temptation) between subject factorial ANOVAs were conducted on food 
consumption variables. Food consumption variables were analyzed separately, and were also 
summed together to create total food, high fat, low fat, sweet, and salty combination outcomes.  
When considering total food consumed, there were no significant main effects of either condition 
or an interaction between independent variables.  When considering each food separately, there 
were no significant main effects for either the restraint or temptation conditions on consumption 
of pretzels, M&M’s or potato chips; however, those in the restriction condition (M = 12.10, SD = 
11.48) consumed more teddy grahams than those in the intuitive eating condition (M = 8.26, SD 
= 7.95), F(1,118) = 4.55, p = .03.  There were no significant main effects or interactions among 
conditions when considering high fat foods (chips & M&M’s), low fat foods (Teddy Grahams & 
pretzels), salty (pretzels & chips) or sweet (M&M’s & Teddy Grahams) as the outcomes (See 
Table 3 for food consumption totals, measured in grams).  
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A 2 (fat type: high fat, low fat) X 2 (restraint condition: restriction and intuitive Eating) X 
2 (temptation manipulation: temptation, no temptation) mixed model was conducted on total 
food consumption.  A marginally significant main effect of food type was found, F(1,118) = 
3.41, p = .07, such that participants consumed more high fat (M = 18.98, SD = 14.15) food 
compared to low-fat (M = 16.90, SD = 13.27).  A second 2 (taste type: sweet, salty) X 2 (restraint 
condition: restriction and intuitive Eating) X 2 temptation manipulation: temptation, no 
temptation) mixed model was conducted on total food consumption.  A significant main effect of 
taste was found, F(1,118) = 7.32,  p = .008, such that participants consumed more sweet foods 
(M = 19.69, SD = 15.34) compared to salty foods (M = 16.20, SD = 12.59).  No interactions 
between temptation condition, restraint condition, fat or taste type were found on food 
consumptions, nor were other main effects significant. 
State variables across time 
Four 4 (time: baseline, post-restraint manipulation, post temptation manipulation, post 
taste-test) X 2 (restraint condition: restriction and intuitive Eating) X 2 (temptation manipulation: 
temptation, no temptation) mixed models were conducted on craving, resistance, positive affect 
and negative affect ratings.  Where spheriticity was violated, Greenhouse-Geiser corrections 
were used in reporting analyses. A significant 3-way interaction was found on resistance, F(2.53, 
301.79) = 3.11, p = .03 (See Figure 4).  To follow up this three-way interaction, follow-ups 
revealed the 2-way interaction between time and temptation condition on resistance was 
significant for the restriction condition, F(2.64, 158.24) = 3.06, p = .04, but was not significant 
for the intuitive eating condition, F(2.41,142.03) = .61, p = .57.   In the restriction condition, 
those in the temptation condition reported a significant change in resistance over time.  
Specifically, repeated contrasts indicated that for those in the restriction and no-temptation 
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conditions, there was a significant decrease in resistance from post-restraint (M = 2.67, SD = 
2.41) to post-temptation manipulation (M = 2.72, SD = 2.13), F(1,29) = 4.62, p = .04, and a 
significant increase in resistance between post-temptation and post-taste test (M = 3.16, SD = 
2.10), F(1,29) = 6.51, p = .02.  For those in the restriction and temptation conditions, the only 
significant change in resistance was an increase between baseline (M = 1.97, SD = 1.67) and 
post-restraint manipulation (M = 2.78, SD = 2.08), F(1,31) = 6.37, p = .02 (See Figure 4). This 
result suggests the temptation manipulation, in addition to the restraint manipulation, had an 
influence on resistance throughout the study, such that those who were led to cognitively control 
their food intake and were exposed to temptation had higher eating resistance post-taste test 
compared to baseline.  This suggests that palatable food may have prompted eating regulation 
goals for those in the restriction condition.  
When considering craving, there was a significant main effect of time on self-reported 
craving throughout the study, F(3,357) = 8.64, p < .001.  Craving significantly decreased from 
post-temptation manipulation (M = 3.96, SD = 2.39) to post taste-test (M = 3.16, SD = 2.21), 
F(1,119) = 15.33, p < .001.  There were no significant interactions between time and temptation 
condition, time and restraint condition, or a 3-way interaction between time, temptation 
condition, and restraint condition on self-reported craving. 
In regards to positive affect, a significant main effect of time on positive affect was 
found, F(2.62,312.29) = 7.80, p < .001, such that positive affect increased over time.  
Specifically, positive affect increased from post-restraint manipulation (M = 5.81, SD = 1.55) 
compared to post-temptation manipulation (M = 5.98, SD = 1.51), F(1,119) = 5.02, p = .03, and 
from post-temptation manipulation to post-taste test  (M = 6.20, SD = 1.51 ), F(1,119) = 4.72,  p  
= .03. The main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between time and 
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restraint condition on positive affect, F(2.62, 312.29) = 2.26, p = .03.  Follow ups revealed that 
positive affect changed over time for people in the intuitive eating condition, F(3,177)=10.99, p 
< .001.  Repeated contrasts revealed that for those in the intuitive eating condition, positive affect 
increased from post-temptation manipulation (M = 5.69, SD = 1.67) to post-taste test, F(1,59) = 
19.66, p < .001.  For those in the restriction condition, positive affect increased post-restraint 
manipulation (M = 5.87, SD = 1.53) compared to post-temptation manipulation (M = 6.23, SD = 
1.43), F(1,60) = 10.14, p = .002. 
In regards to negative affect, there were no significant main effects of temptation or 
restraint conditions, or interaction between temptation and restraint conditions, on negative 
affect.   
Goal conflict 
Goal-conflict was computed using the MIN approach (Shimmack, 2001) of co-occurring 
craving and resistance scores post-temptation task and post-taste test.   There were no significant 
main effects or interactions among restraint and temptation conditions on goal-conflict post-
temptation task.  However, following the taste test there was a significant main effect of restraint 
condition, such that those in the restriction condition evidenced greater goal-conflict (M = 2.03, 
SD = 1.72) than those in the intuitive eating condition (M = 1.34, SD = 1.61), F(1,119) = 5.20, p 
= .02.  Mixed affect was computed in the same way as goal-conflict (i.e., the MIN approach).  
There were no significant main effects or interactions among restraint and temptation conditions 
on mixed-affect post-temptation task.  However, following the taste test there was a marginally 
significant main effect of restraint condition, such that those in the restriction condition 
evidenced greater mixed affect (M = 1.87, SD = 2.07) than those in the intuitive eating condition 
(M = 1.25, SD = 1.63), F(1,119) = 3.39, p = .07. 
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A hierarchical linear regression was conducted to assess the causality of a restrictive 
mindset towards eating on end of study (i.e., post-taste test) goal-conflict after controlling for 
gender and RRS restrained eating scores.  A significant regression equation was found, F(3,119) 
= 6.71, p < .001, with an R
2 
of .15.  Specifically, with gender and restrained eating scores in the 
model, the restriction condition predicted higher levels of goal-conflict, t(119) = 2.58, , p = .01, 
B = .74.  Restrained eating scores, defined via the RRS, were not significant predictors of goal-
conflict in either step of the hierarchical model.   
Conclusion 
The aim of the current study was to glean a clearer and more in depth understanding of 
the cognitive pathways thought to underlie the regulation of eating behavior.  In lieu of 
investigating restrained eating as an individual difference factor, the present work extended 
previous research (Herman & Polivy, 1980) that implies the regulation of eating behavior is 
controlled via cognitive mechanisms by empirically testing it in a laboratory setting.  Thus, this 
study was designed with the intention of modeling the theoretical cognitive mechanisms of 
restraint in unrestrained eaters to investigate restricted cognitive focus as a causal mechanism of 
disinhibited eating and other non-eating outcomes thought to be associated with restrained 
eating, such as goal-conflict.   
 The study tested a series of predictions regarding food consumption.  First, I predicted 
that individuals guided to think restrictively about food would evidence greater disinhibited 
eating after being exposed to food temptations compared to neutral temptations, whereas 
individuals guided to think intuitively about food should not consume different amounts of food 
as a function of temptation exposure. This prediction was not supported, and in fact the only food 
consumption variable that significantly differed based on condition was teddy grahams, whereby 
35 
 
individuals in the restriction condition exhibited greater disinhibited eating than those in the 
intuitive eating condition.  As noted, results from both the pilot and experimental studies both 
indicated the restriction manipulation was effective in changing participant’s self-reported 
strategy used to guide their eating behaviors.  This was true for multiple measures of resistance 
(e.g., state assessment of resistance; eating strategy questionnaire), which suggests participant’s 
momentary cognitive restraint was strongly influenced by the manipulation.  Thus, it could be 
that a restricted mindset was stronger than the immediate temptation and therefore food 
consumption did not increase when individuals were exposed to temptation.  That is, the 
temptation may not have been salient or strong enough to conflict with the restrictive mindset 
that was created and lead to disinhibited eating as a result.   
Importantly, literature typically uses individual difference measures to capture restraint, 
which consider it as a trait-level construct rather than a momentary process.  Previous research 
has long suggested that people with restrained eating behaviors are highly susceptible to 
overeating when faced with temptation (Herman & Polivy, 1980), and it is likely that this pattern 
of behavior develops over time.  Though it may require individuals who restrict their caloric 
intake (i.e., dieters) extensive effort to do so initially (van Koningsbruggen, Stroebe, & Aarts, 
2013), research indicates this process becomes more habitual over time (Rideout & Barr, 2009).  
Given that habitual behavior is more prone to error-processing (Baumeister et al., 2000) and self-
regulation failure (Wood & Neal, 2007), it could be that habitual restraint is more susceptible to 
self-regulation failure than less engrained and more effortful cognitive restraint. As such, 
exposing participants to a brief manipulation of restraint and temptation may not have been 
effective in altering immediate eating behavior; however, future work may wish to examine 
longer-term effects (e.g., eating behavior over the days following the laboratory study) which 
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might more accurately represent the pathway through which restrained eating culminates in 
disinhibited eating.  Further, I purposefully recruited healthy, unrestrained eaters via the Revised 
Restraint Scale (Herman & Polivy, 1980), though there are a set of alternative scales (e.g., Three-
Factor Eating Questionnaire; Stunkard, 1981) that similarly measure restrained eating.  
Interestingly, studies comparing the psychometric properties of these measures (e.g., Allison, 
Kalinsky, & Gorman, 1992) suggest that each measure taps into a variant of the same construct, 
and that alternative measures of restraint, such as the Eating Inventory, represents a more valid 
measure of the intent to cognitively manage food intake (Williamson et al., 2007).  As such, 
while the intent was to recruit healthy, unrestrained eaters it is possible that the RRS may not 
have been the best measure to use for this purpose.  In addition, previous research has long 
suggested that people with restrained eating behaviors are highly susceptible to overeating when 
faced with temptation (Herman & Polivy, 1980), and it is likely that this pattern of behavior 
develops over time.  Exposing participants to a brief manipulation of restraint and temptation 
may not have been effective in altering immediate eating behavior; however, future work may 
wish to examine longer-term effects (e.g., eating behavior over the days following the laboratory 
study) which might more accurately represent the pathway through which restrained eating 
culminates in disinhibited eating.  
Second, I predicted that those guided to think restrictively about food would report lower 
levels of positive and greater levels of negative affect compared to those guided to think 
intuitively about food, with the assumption that thinking in a restrictive way about food would be 
largely unpleasant. In line with this assumption, I predicted that negative mood would increase 
and positive mood would decrease over time for those guided to think restrictively about food, 
whereas negative mood should remain constant or decrease and positive affect should increase 
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for those guided to think intuitively about food.  I also predicted positive affect would be higher 
following exposure to food temptation for those guided to think intuitively about food compared 
to those guided to think restrictively about food, which would suggest the interactive effect of 
temptation and a restricted mindset is negative in valence and therefore more likely to result in 
maladaptive downstream eating behaviors.  This prediction was not directly supported (i.e., there 
were no significant interaction effects between restraint and temptation on positive affect or 
negative affect).  It is worth noting that those in the intuitive eating condition reported greater 
levels of positive affect at each time point compared to baseline throughout the study, which 
suggests individuals felt more pleasant after reading about the benefits of intuitive eating, rating 
products (irrespective of temptation status), and completing a taste test.  However, this 
relationship was not significant for those in the restriction condition.  It could be that being asked 
to think in a particular way about food that differs from the “norm” for that individual 
counteracts the normative increases in positive mood individuals experience when trying tasty 
foods, which could have downstream implications on eating behavior.  Alternatively, it could be 
that the specific restrictive nature of these thoughts is unpleasant and leads to such affective 
outcomes.  Though past work has found an association between restrained eating and negative 
affect (McFarlane, Polivy, & Herman, 1998; Papies, Stroebe, & Aarts, 2009), no work has tested 
the causal mechanisms of a restrained mindset on negative (or positive) affect.  In fact, the 
results of the current study indicated that a restrained mindset predicted marginally significant 
greater mixed affect, suggesting a possible explanation as to why separate levels of positive and 
negative affect did not alter as a function of restraint condition.  Thus, this evidence provides 
preliminary evidence that a restricted mindset may have differential effects on affective 
38 
 
outcomes than an unrestrained mindset, and further work investigating these phenomena is 
clearly warranted.   
Third, I predicted that levels of craving and resistance would be higher among those 
guided to think restrictively about food compared to those guided to think intuitively about food 
during exposure to food temptations, with the assumption being that attempting to restrict eating 
behavior may backfire and result in higher craving, despite the heightened attempted resistance, 
when in the face of palatable food. However, after being exposed to neutral objects, I anticipated 
only resistance would be significantly higher for those guided to think restrictively about food 
compared to those guided to think intuitively about food, as the palatable food temptation would 
not be present to interact with a restrictive mindset.  Findings indicated resistance was greater for 
those in the restriction condition when exposed to food temptation compared to those in the 
intuitive eating condition, which was expected; however, there were no significant differences in 
self-reported resistance based on temptation condition for those guided to think restrictively 
about food.  Similarly, there were no significant differences in craving based on restraint 
condition.  As previously stated, it could be that the trajectory through which restricted cognitive 
focus contributes to disinhibited eating is developed over a longer period of time than was 
allowed in the 90 minute laboratory session.  In fact, the time length between the restraint 
manipulation, temptation manipulation,  and taste test was less than 30 minutes in total, and the 
temptation task only lasted for 7 minutes.  It is unrealistic to believe the longstanding and deep-
rooted restrained mindset that theoretically occurs in restrained eaters can be modeled in this 
amount of time.  While restrained eaters do, at times, overeat when faced with temptation, they 
are often able to successfully restrict their eating behaviors (Ouwehand & Papies, 2010).  Similar 
to dieters who embark on their dieting journey with the best of intentions and experience initial 
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success, individuals in the current study may not have experienced the downstream effects of 
restricted cognitive focus (e.g., disinhibited eating when exposed to temptation) due to the 
novelty of this mindset and their subsequent initial heightened motivation to restrict food intake, 
which may help explain why temptation did not influence resistance or craving for people guided 
to think restrictively about food intake.  In line with this reasoning, our results suggest that post-
taste test craving was significantly higher for those in the restriction condition; thus, lengthening 
the study and/or adding additional temptation exposures and assessments may result in 
interactive effects on eating behavior based on temptation and restraint conditions. 
The results of the current study did indicate that after controlling for gender and RRS 
restrained eating scores, a restrained mindset toward food and eating predicted greater levels of 
goal-conflict following the taste test, while restrained eating scores on their own did not predict 
goal-conflict. This finding is particularly important, as it further supports the prediction that there 
may be differential effects of restricted cognitive focus toward eating and restrained eating as an 
individual difference factor.  While the goal-conflict model of eating (Stroebe et al., 2013) posits 
that eating behavior of individuals attempting to control their food intake is controlled by two 
conflicting goals that are cognitive in nature (i.e., the goal of eating for pleasure vs. the goal of 
controlling one’s weight), this phenomenon has strictly been examined in restrained and 
unrestrained eaters.  This is problematic, as considering restraint to be a grouping implies 
individuals either possess restraint-like tendencies or they do not and does not allow for the 
examination of restrained eating on a spectrum, varying in degree of severity.  Extant research 
has indicated that restrained individuals do experience cognitive processing deficits when faced 
with tempting food (Green at al., 1994; Mann & Ward, 2004) but whether such deficits manifest 
as a function of restrained eaters as a trait group, or whether it is cognitive restraint that 
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influences the behaviors often exhibited by restrained eaters, has yet to be tested.  The results of 
the present study provide preliminary evidence that: (1) restrained eating may reflect momentary 
cognitive processing, rather than a general and stylistic approach toward eating, and (2) that 
cognitive restraint may be a better predictor of goal-conflict compared to restrained eating as a 
taxonomy.  Future work examining the mediational effects of goal-conflict in the relationship 
between cognitive restraint and both eating and non-eating outcomes is clearly warranted. 
Several limitations to the present work are noteworthy.  As mentioned, the timeframe 
through which the study was conducted may have been too short for the manipulations to work 
as intended.  Results from both the pilot and laboratory based studies indeed suggest I was able 
to manipulate restraint among healthy, unrestrained eating individuals; however, the theoretical 
goal-conflict experienced as an effect of restricted cognitive focus (i.e., co-occurring craving and 
resistance) may unfold over a longer period of time.  Future work may wish to incorporate 
ambulatory assessment methodology, which allows for an examination of individuals in their 
daily lives, to assess the downstream effects of cognitive restriction.  Additionally, while the 
temptation task did result in increased craving overall, individual difference factors (e.g., liking 
of the food items) may have influenced the manipulation.  I did not ask participants how 
tempting they found the food they were exposed to, and I therefore could not exclude people 
who did not experience the situation as a temptation.  Future research may seek to create 
temptation situations that are personally relevant to each individual to ensure true temptation is 
experienced.  A particularly important limitation worth noting is the significant shift in restrained 
eating scores from the pre-screening measures to the laboratory study, which suggests I may not 
have obtained a true sample of unrestrained eaters who are consistent in their non-restrictive 
eating behaviors.  Future work could use a lower cut-off score on the Revised Restraint Scale 
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(e.g., 12 or below, compared to the score of 15 used in the present study) to increase the 
likelihood that a clean sample of unrestrained eaters is chosen.  An additional limitation includes 
the food items chosen for the taste-test.  The chosen foods met my aim to use low-fat, high-fat, 
sweet, and salty foods in the taste-test to increase the likelihood participants would be exposed to 
at least one type they enjoyed; however, there are hundreds of foods that meet those criteria and 
could have been viewed as more (or less) favorable than the foods chosen for the study.    
Furthermore, it should be noted that the generalizability and interpretability of the current study 
were limited in that the ethnic majority of the sample was White and individuals were 
predominantly female college seeking, emerging adults.  Future work recruiting a community 
sample that is not course-credit seeking, college-aged would increase the generalizability and 
strengthen the conclusions presented here. 
To my knowledge, this is the only known study to date to manipulate restricted cognitive 
focus and examine its causal effects on disinhibited eating behavior.  Extant research 
overwhelmingly investigates restrained eating through individual difference factors and it is 
unclear whether engaging in effortful cognition to control dietary restraint behavior actually 
causes disinhibited eating behavior.  Though the results of the present study suggest cognitive 
restraint may not influence immediate eating behavior, work investigating the real-world 
applicability and contextual influences may help in our understanding of how cognitive restraint 
influences eating patterns over time.  Overall, understanding how restraint operates on a 
cognitive level is critical to developing targeted interventions and preventing maladaptive 
behavioral outcomes.  Future work assessing other forms of self-regulation failure outside the 
context of eating behavior may be crucial in disentangling the cognitive restraint processes that 
underlie regulation and goal-directed behavior. 
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Appendix A 
Pilot Study Figures 
 
Figure 1. Pilot-study eating strategy change as a function of restraint manipulation 
 
**Higher scores reflect greater intuitive eating; lower scores represent stronger reporting of 
mentally planning/managing food intake 
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Figure 2. Pilot-study state-level resistance based on restrained eating status and restraint 
condition 
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Appendix B 
Experimental Study Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Timeline of experimental procedures 
 
Time Event Measures 
0-5 Participant arrives, signs 
consent form 
 
5-10 Initial taste-rating ESG, GCG, Baseline hunger and satiety 
10-20 Restraint manipulation Content quiz, article reflection free-write, ESG and 
GCG directly after 
20-30 Temptation manipulation Product rating forms, thoughts about products form, 
ESG and GCG 
30-40 Taste-test Taste rating forms, ESG and GCG 
40-60 Online questionnaire(s) Individual difference measures assessing restrained 
eating, self-control, and personality 
60-65 Debriefing  
 
GCG = Goal-Conflict Grid 
ESG = Evaluative Space Grid 
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Table 2. A comparison of demographic variables across temptation and restraint 
conditions 
 
  
Temptation 
(n = 31) 
No Temptation 
(n = 30) 
Intuitive Eating (n = 61) Gender 51.6% Female 70.0% Female 
 Age 19.23 (1.09) 19.50 (1.76) 
 Ethnicity 83.9% White 63.3% White 
 Total RRS 
9.61 (SD = 
3.24) 
10.60 (SD = 
3.05) 
    
  
Temptation 
(n = 32) 
No Temptation 
(n = 30) 
Restriction (n = 62) Gender 59.4% Female 66.7% Female 
 Age 19.65 (2.81) 19.43 (1.52) 
 Ethnicity 62.5% White 83.3% White 
 Total RRS 
9.69 (SD = 
3.42) 
9.47 (SD = 3.38) 
 
  
  
5
2
 
 
Table 3. Food consumption totals (in grams) based on restraint and temptation conditions 
 
  Restriction Condition  Intuitive Eating Condition 
  Temptation No temptation Temptation No temptation 
Food Items Teddy Grahams 12.19 (12.73) 12.00 (10.20) 7.48 (8.67) 9.07 (7.17) 
 Chips 10.22 (10.46) 10.33 (10.01) 7.65 (6.31) 10.00 (9.19) 
 Pretzels 7.06 (6.12) 6.60 (7.68) 8.10 (7.17) 5.50 (6.01) 
 M&Ms 8.97 (9.28) 8.97 (10.39) 10.71 (8.83) 8.93 (7.33) 
 Total Consumption 38.44 (27.09) 37.90 (30.06) 33.94 (21.34) 33.52 (19.17) 
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Figure 3. Eating strategy scores based on restraint condition 
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Figure 4. Resistance scores over time for as a function of restraint and temptation conditions 
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